Research Discussion Paper No. 67

POLITICAL DEMOGRAPHY OF THE EMERGENCE OF BANGLADESH

by

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Paper contributed to Chaire Quetelet 1989. Revolution et Population. Oct. 17-20, 1989. Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium.

MAY 1990

ABSTRACT

The regional differences in the ingredients of national integration along with the West Pakistani domination and neo-colonial exploitation led to the Bengali nationalist movements in East Pakistan culminating in the emergence of Bangladesh.

I. Introduction

Following a nine-month long bloody war against the Pakistani Army, Bangladesh, formerly East Pakistan, became independent from Pakistani domination and neo-colonial exploitation on December 16, 1971. Although the question of "Bangladeshi Nationalism" originated in reaction to the ideological basis on which Pakistan was created, the political movements for autonomy and freedom were triggered by the Central Government's (dominated by West Pakistan) attempts to impose a cultural, political, and economic hegemony upon East Pakistan. The socio-geo-demographic factors (e.g., population size, linguistic composition of population, and distance between the regions) determined the intensity and the strength of the nationalist movements. This paper aims at tracing the factors that influenced the process of nationalist revolution culminating in the emergence of independent Bangladesh. This is the first part of a study of political demography of Bangladesh with reference to the time up to the creation of the country in 1971. A sequel to this will deal with the situation in the post-emergence period.

2. Conceptual Framework

In order to construct a theoretical model of political demography of the emergence of Bangladesh, it is proper to ask some important questions: Do demographic factors determine the course of a revolution? If yes, how? Directly or indirectly? As the demographic condition is interdependent with the socio-economic and the politico-cultural conditions of a society, independent effects of demographic factors cannot be expected. But depending on the situation, demographic factors can cause an outcome that lead to political unrest (e.g., an election upset by a deprived majority). Similarly, a situation created by a political event can affect demographic conditions (e.g., high death and migration rate, low marriage and birth rate due to civil and political unrest; or lack of geographic mobility due to large distance between the regions of a country). Keeping this interdependence in perspective, a conceptual framework is presented schematically in Figure 1. This model can be examined in the context of other countries and expanded further. But this study confines its applicability to Bangladesh situation.

FIGURE 1
A Conceptual Framework of Political Demography of the Emergence of Bangladesh


Regional Differences in Social, Cultural, Geographic and Demographic Conditions
Political, Economic, Administrative and Structural Exploitation
Conditions Favourable for a Revolution
Role and Strength of Political Forces
External Assistance/ Intervention
Revolution

The model shows that the regional differences in socio-geo-demographic and cultural conditions along with the political, economic, administrative and structural exploitation by the Central Government create conditions favourable for a revolution. These conditions lead to a successful revolution, if two conditions are met. First, strong political forces able enough to unite and mobilize people against severe oppression. Second, right external assistance/intervention at the right time. In the case of Bangladesh, these two conditions were met, and resulted in a successful revolution. The nature of the nationalist revolution in Bangladesh can be debated, whether it is a bourgeoisie democratic revolution, national democratric revolution, or a completed social revolution. A discussion of this debate is beyond the scope of this paper. The term "revolution" is used in this paper in a simple political sense.

With this conceptual framework in mind, an attempt has been made to delineate the political demography of the emergence of Bangladesh. In so doing, first, the regional differences in the ingredients of national integration --- geography, area and population, language and culture, economy and society --- are highlighted; and second, the uneven development in socio-cultural, political, and economic spheres resulting from the unequal treatment and exploitation by the Central Government that transformed the sense of regionalism into a nationalist revolution is elaborated. The aspect of external assistance and intervention by India and other countries will not be pursued in this paper.

3. Regional Differences

The demand for two nations based on religion and sticking to it to the last moment by the Muslim League Party leaders made the division of India inevitable. Pakistan, as a result, became an entity of two separate lands --- West Pakistan comprising north-western part of India and East Pakistan comprising eastern part of Bengal. The events that led to the political union of the two areas are complex and the discussion of which is not within the scope of this paper (for details, see Ali 1946; Khaliquzzaman 1961; Pirzada 1968; Shamsuddin 1973; and Islam 1978). Political observers regarded Pakistan as a "double country" (Weekes 1964:3) with an Islamic ideological foundation.

Whether religion can be a foundation for a modern state is an issue to be settled by the political scientists. However, it did not work for Pakistan. The two wings were so diverse in many respects that the viability of Pakistan was questioned right away.

The two regions were geographically separated from each other. Geography and climate were different. The languages spoken in one area were not familiar to the people of the other. Cultural traditions had different roots of origin. Population distribution was disproportionate. Landownership and stratification patterns were different in these two regions. Economic, social and political organizations were also different. All these differences had implications for the future course of the country and the life of people. More importantly, some of these differences were crucially important in determining the strength of the political movements toward the independence of Bangladesh. The regional differences in the socio-demographic conditions are highlighted below.

Physical separation and geography

Pakistan's two wings --- East and West --- were physically separated by more than 1000 miles of Indian territory, located at opposite ends of India surrounded by different neighbours, cultural environment and political strategic interests (Marshall 1959:5). See Map 1. This physical separation had implications in the socio-demographic and political development of the regions and the country. It made the communication and transportation between the two regions difficult and expensive. This limited the geographic and social mobility to a small and affluent group of people. Another aspect of this separation was that the development of one region did not have significant effect on the other (Jahan 1972:10).

The different topography and climatic conditions in the two regions have led to divergent needs and problems. East Pakistan, now Bangladesh, is mainly a low plain containing the combined delta of the Ganges and the Brahmaputra rivers. The weather is hot and humid, especially in the summer. The winter is moderate. Heavy rainfall produces an average rainfall of 100 inches from the summer monsoons. This creates flooding, which requires both flood control measures and irrigation.

MAP 1



The Partition of India—1947

Source: Tayyeb , A. 1966. Pakistan: A Political Geography. London: Oxford University Press, p. 5.

Whereas, West Pakistan, now Pakistan, has a varied topographic condition. "They range from the highly mountaineous types in the north to the flat low-land types in the south. In between are river valleys, enclosed basins, plateaux and uplands, some rich and properous, others desolate and barren" (Tayyeb 1966:6). The climates of West Pakistan ranges from cold and relatively humid to dry and hot. The average rainfall is less than 20 inches. As a result, extensive irrigation is of critical importance to West Pakistan. These physical differences are also reflected in the differences in cropping patterns and varieties, food habits, customs, social attitudes, economic conditions and political biases, factors that have affected significantly the lifestyles and the development of the regions (Tayyeb 1966:15).

Population distribution

In 1951, East Pakistan had a population of 41.9 million in an area of 55,126 square miles, while West Pakistan had an area of 310,403 square miles that contained only 33.7 million population. In other words, 55.4 per cent of Pakistan's total population lived in an area that was nearly one-sixth of the area of West Pakistan. This resulted in a high population density in East Pakistan (777 persons per square mile in 1951), which was about seven times that of West Pakistan (109 persons per square mile).

The population size in the 1961 census indicates almost an equal rate of population growth, i.e., both populations increased almost in the same amount, about 8 million (Table 1). But the figures of a decade earlier show a significant difference in growth rate. The population of East Pakistan rather decreased by 0.1 million from 1947 to 1951, while West Pakistani population increased by more than five million. This difference in population growth during 1941-1951 illustrates the significance of immigration rather than each region's natural increase. While the crude birth rates and crude death rates for each region were almost identical, the influx of refugees arising from the partition of India contributed significantly to the growth of these two regions. According to the 1951 census, East Pakistan received only 0.7 million refugees, while West Pakistan had 7.2 million. This also contributed to the high rate of urbanization of West Pakistan (17.8 per cent compared to 4.3 per

TABLE 1

Selected socio-demographic characteristics of East and West Pakistan

Characteristics	Year	East Pakistan	West Pakistan
Area in square miles (percentage)	1951	55126 (15.1)	310403 (84.9)
Population in millions (percentage)	1941	42.0 (59.8)	28.3 (40.2)
	1951	41.9 (55.4)	33.7 (44.6)
	1961	50.8 (54.2)	42.7 (45.8)
Population density (persons per square mile)	1951	777	109
	1961	922	138
Broad age distribution (percentage)	1951 Age Groups		
	0-14	42.1	43.2
	15-60	53.5	51.1
	60+	4.4	5.7
	1961 Age Groups		
	0-14	46.1	42.4
	15-60	48.7	50.7
	50+	5.2	6.9
Distribution of population by religion (percentage)	1951		
	Muslims	76.8	97.1
	Hindus	22.0	1.6
	Christians	0.3	1.3
	Others	0.9	0.0
	1961		
	Muslims	80.4	97.2
	Hindus	18.4	1.5
	Christians	0.3	1.3
	Others	0.9	0.0
Crude birth rate	1962-65	53.0	52.0
Crude death rate	1962-65	20.0	18.0

Table 1 cont'd

Characteristics	Year	East Pakistan	West Pakistan
Urbanization (percentage)	1951	4.3	17.8
	1961	5.2	22.5
Literacy rate (percentage)	1951	21.1	16.4
	1961	17.6	13.6
Distributions by education (percentage)			
without formal education	1951	49.4	58.9
	1961	16.2	10.7
primary school	1951	33.9	24.6
	1961	63.5	47.1
Middle and secondary school	1951	13.0	10.7
	1961	16.5	29.9
Matriculation	1951	3.2	4.7
	1961	2.8	9.0
Intermediate	1951	----	----
	1961	0.6	1.9
Degree	1951	0.5	0.9
	1961	0.3	1.0
Higher degree	1951	0.1	0.3
	1961	0.1	0.5

Sources: Population Census of Pakistan 1961. Vol. I. Part 1. St. 2.18, Part II. St. 2.3, 2.11 and 2.14, Part III. St. 3.3, Part IV, St. 4.1 and 4.4; Farooqui, M., Iqbal, F. and Farooq, G.M. 1971. Final Report of the Population Growth Estimation Experiemnt 1962-65. Dhaka: Pakistan Insteitute of Development Economics; Central Statistical Office 1968. Pakistan Statistical Yearbook 1968. Karachi: Ministry of Economic Affairs. Pp. 154-16, 39; Aqzal, M. 1974. The Population of Pakistan, Islamabad: Pakistan Institute of Develofpment Economics. P. 2; Hong, S. 1980. Demographic Characteristics of Bangladesh. Dhaka: United States Agency for International Development. P. 5.

cent of East Pakistan). 39.9 per cent of urbanization was due to immigration according to the 1951 census (Jahan 1972:12). Although the natural increase was similar in both the regions, the high rate of growth was evident in the 0-14 years of age groups in East Pakistan (46.1 per cent in 1961 from 42.1 per cent in 1951). The proportion of the population in this age groups declined slightly (from 43.2 per cent to 42.4 per cent) in West Pakistan during 1951-1961 (Table 1). The effect of this higher proportion of younger people was heavy on the labour force in the late '60s and the '70s.

The distribution of population by religion in these two units was dissimilar. Table 1 shows that East Pakistan had a greater proportion of the Hindu population than West Pakistan. In fact, West Pakistan could be fully regarded as the land of the Muslims (97.1 per cent in 1951). Due to the emphasis on Islam in Pakistan, a substantial number of the Hindu population migrated to India after the partition. Although this emigration eased the land problems in East Pakistan and paved the way for the local people, the immediate vacuum was not filled by the immigrant entrepreneurs who contributed a great amount to the economic development of West Pakistan (Papanek 1969).

Language and culture

The differences in language and culture of these two wings of Pakistan were distinct. East Pakistan had a population which was homogeneous linguistically. In 1951, Bengali, the main language of the people of East Pakistan, was spoken by more than 98 per cent of the population of the province (Table 2). On the other hand, West Pakistan had several major language groups, of which Punjabi was spoken by 67 per cent of the population. Nationally, Bengali was the language of the majority. According to the 1951 census, 56.4 per cent of the population of Pakistan had Bengali as mother tongue, followed by Punjabi (28.6 per cent), Sindhi (5.5 per cent), Pushto (3.5 per cent) and Urdu (3.4 per cent). All the major languages showed regional character in usage. Very few people knew or spoke the language of the other regions. However, to Wilber (1964:71), the multilingual situation in West Pakistan "presents a complex polyglot", while East Pakistan "very closely approximates a linguistic unit".

TABLE 2

Distribution of Population by Mother Tongue, 1951 and 1961

Langauges	1951			1961		
	East Pakistan	West Pakistan	Pakistan	East Pakistan	West Pakistan	Pakistan
	%	%	%	%	%	%
Bengali	98.16	0.02	56.40	98.42	0.11	55.48
Punjabi	0.02	67.08	28.55	0.02	66.39	29.02
Sindhi	0.01	12.85	5.51	0.01	12.59	5.51
Pushto	-----	8.16	3.48	0.01	8.47	3.70
Urdu	0.64	7.05	3.37	0.61	7.57	3.65
Baluchi	-----	3.04	1.29	-----	2.49	1.09
Brahui	-----	0.70	0.30	-----	0.93	0.41
Persian	-----	0.07	0.03	-----	0.07	0.03
English	0.01	0.03	0.02	0.01	0.04	0.02
Others	0.16	1.00	1.09	0.92	1.34	1.09

Source: Population Census of Pakistan 1961. Vol. 1, Part IV, St. 5.3.

Culturally, there was also little in common between the two units of the country. East Pakistani people had the cultural traits similar to that of South and South-east Asia, while the people of West Pakistan traced their ethno-cultural origin to the Middle Eastern Muslims (Karim 1956). Even though the religious beliefs of these two regions were common, the cultural expression of the practices were different. East Pakistani type of Islam was much more accomodating and liberal than that of the dogmatic Punjabi Muslim or the religious fanaticism of the Muslim Pathans (Tayyeb 1966:16). Probably due to this orthodox character of West Pakistani Islam, almost all the Hindus and the Sikhs fled to India after partition. There were also differences in the origin of nationalism. West Pakistan had the Indo-Islamic origin. In East Pakistan, Indo-Islamic was fused with the Indo-Sanskritic (Hasan 1985:149) to create the "Bengali nationalism".

Economy and society

The economy of both the regions was dominated by agriculture. Agricultural production accounted for about 71 per cent of the foreign exchange and about 60 per cent of the total national income (Pakistan 1963:31). But it was in East Pakistan that the agriculture sector was more important. As Table 3 shows in 1951, about 85 per cent of the total civilian labour force in East Pakistan was engaged in agriculture as compared to 65 per cent in West Pakistan. Industry and services sectors were more developed in the West than in the East. 6.6 per cent and 8.7 per cent of the labour force were in industry and services respectively in East Pakistan, while 11.6 per cent and 23.1 per cent respectively in West Pakistan.

The dominance of agriculture in East Pakistan implied higher contribution to national income and foreign exchange (from the sale of jute) earnings of the country. But the pressure on agricultural land was much higher in East than in West Pakistan. Table 3 shows that in 1951 only 40 per cent of the total cultivable land of the country was in East Pakistan, which contained more than 64 per cent of the cultivators in the country. East Pakistan's share of cultivable land per cultivator was 2.0 acres, while in West Pakistan, it was 5.4 acres. The proportion of landless agricultural labourers in East Pakistan (14.3 per cent) was more than six times that in West Pakistan (2.3 per cent).

TABLE 3

Labour Force (12 years and over) in Pakistan

		East Pakistan	West Pakistan
		%	%
As to total population civilian			
Labour force	1951	30.7	30.6
	1961	33.2	31.8
Agricultural	1951	25.6	19.9
	1961	28.2	18.8
Non-agricultural	1951	5.2	10.7
	1961	5.0	13.0
As to civilian labour force			
Agricultural	1951	84.7	65.3
	1961	85.3	59.3
	1966-7	77.8	53.4
Industry	1951	6.6	11.6
	1961	6.0	20.2
	1966-7	9.6	25.4
Services	1951	8.7	23.1
	1961	8.7	20.5
	1966-7	12.6	21.2
Number of cultivators in thousands	1951	10624	5880
(percentage to total)		(64.4)	(35.6)
	1961	14085	7052
		(66.6)	(37.4)
Cultivable land in acres	1951	21317	32007
(percentage to total)		(40.0)	(60.0)
	1961	21640	41370
		(34.3)	(65.7)

Table 3 cont'd

		East Pakistan	West Pakistan
Cultivable land per cultivator (percentage)	1951	2.01	5.44
	1961	1.54	5.87
Landless agricultural labourers (percentage)	1951	14.3	2.3
	1961	17.5	8.0

Sources: Population Census of Pakistan 1961. Vol. 1 Part V. St. 6.10, 6.15 and 6.16; Griffin, K., and Khan, A.R. (eds.). 1972. Growth and Inequality in Pakistan. London: The Macmillan Press Ltd. P. 4.

In West Pakistan, landownership was concentrated in a few hands. 53.3 per cent of the total land was owned by 6.9 per cent of owners with a landholding size ranging from 25 to 500 acres and more (Table 4). In other words, 46.7 per cent of the total cultivable land was owned by 93 per cent of the owners with landholding sizes under 25 acres. On the other hand, in East Pakistan, the owners with the landholding size of 25 acres and under constituted 99 per cent of the owners owning 94 per cent of the land. This different pattern of landownership shows the difference in the stratification in the regions. The departure of the Hindu Zamindars and landlords from East Pakistan after partition and the East Bengal Acquisition and Tenancy Act of 1950 eased the landlordism and made the society less stratified. As a result, the class differences were not rigid (Jahan 1972:19).

The patterns of social and political organizations were also different in these two regions. In East Pakistan, power was highly localized and fragmanted due to a well-knit social organization (Bertocci 1968), "whereas in rural West Pakistan, the power structure and leadership patterns are relatively stable" (Jahan 1972:19). But East Pakistan had a better political organization (Papanek 1967:19) and higher literacy rate (21.1 per cent) compared to West Pakistan (16.4 per cent). Although the overall literacy level was higher in East than in West Pakistan, the proportion of people with higher education was higher in West Pakistan (see Table 1). The literacy rate in East Pakistan was heavy on primary and secondary educational levels, while in West Pakistan on higher education. The latter was associated with the relatively high degree of urbanization and industrialization in that region. In 1951, urbanization was 17.8 per cent in West compared to 4.3 per cent in East Pakistan.

4. Differential Development

Given the regional differences as pointed out above, the only means of keeping the two regions integrated was to accord proper importance to the regions by guaranteeing fundamental rights and social justice to all through a democratic system. Although the premise of the Pakistani State was Islam fostering equality and brotherhood, in reality, the Islamic principles were not practiced at all. Since the two wings had nothing in common but religion, the leadership had to use it to cement the regions. But this did not happen, because religion is not a solid basis for nationalism (Speare

TABLE 4

Landownership Pattern in East and West Pakistan

Landholding Size (in acres)		Percentage Dist of owners		Percentage Dist of land owned	
EAST PAKISTAN					
0 to 0.4	under 5	13	77	1	42
0.5 to 0.9		11		2	
1.0 to 2.4		27		13	
2.5 to 4.9		26		26	
5.0 to 7.4		12	22	19	52
7.5 to 12.4		7		19	
12.5 to 24.9		3		14	
25.0 to 39.9		---		3	
40.0 and over		---		2	
WEST PAKISTAN					
5 or less		64.5		15.0	
5 to 25		28.5		31.7	
25 to 100		5.7		22.4	
100 to 500		1.1		15.9	
500 and above		0.1		15.0	

Sources: Agriculture Census Organization 1962. Pakistan Census of Agriculture. East Pakistan. Vol. 1. Karachi: Ministry of Food and Agriculture. P. 33; and West Pakistan 1959. Land Reforms Commission Report 1959. Lahore: West Pakistan Government Press. Appendix I.

1963:37). The central leadership, controlled by the West Pakistanis, dominated and exploited East Pakistan in a colonial fashion. Some important aspects of this neo-colonial treatment which are regarded as the determining factors in the social and political movements for independence of Bangladesh are discussed below.

The national language issue

Language has an important role as one of the bases for national integration. We know from the previous dicussion that different regions of the country had different languages for communication. For example, the language of East Pakistan, the language of the majority, was unfamiliar to the people of West Pakistan and vice versa. The interesting point is that East Pakistan was linguistically homogeneous, while West Pakistan was heterogeneous. Under such a situation, the solution to the question of national language was to recognize at least two major languages from the two regions as state languages. Then Bengali and Punjabi would be the natural choices. Instead, the government declared a third language, Urdu, spoken by only 3.4 per cent of the country's total population and 7.1 per cent of the West Pakistani population, as the state language. This was probably the most dangerous mistake that the Pakistani leadership had made. This set the stage for the disintegration of Pakistan.

The selection of one language hurt the feeling of the Bengalis and the Punjabis. The selection of Urdu was unjustified and undemocratic, because it was the fifth major language spoken by the Pakistani people. The Bengali members of the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan demanded the recognition of Bengali as a language of deliberation along with English and Urdu. But that demand was turned down. The Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan categorically stated: "Pakistan is a Muslim state and it must have as its lingua franca the language of the Muslim Nation ... and that language can only be Urdu and no other language" (Pakistan 1948:15-17). Although a minority language, it had significance to the West Pakistani leaders, because Urdu was closely associated with the Muslim politics of the sub-continent.

Jinnah declared in Dhaka in March, 1948, repeatedly and emphatically "... let me make it very clear to you that the state language of Pakistan is going to be Urdu and no other language. Anyone who tries to mislead you is really the enemy of Pakistan" (Ahmed 1964:490). Not only the demand of Bengali as one of the state languages was denied, but also it was condemned as un-Islamic, as Bengali was a language of the Hindus and the literature and the script carried the Hindu imagery. They even attempted to Islamize the Bengali language by introducing Arabic script for it (Bhattacharjee 1973:58). The attempt to impose Urdu and ignore Bengali as national language triggered a wide-spread linguistic and secular nationalistic movement in East Pakistan, led by students, intellectuals, and professionals and supported by the masses. This nationwide opposition to the language policy demanded a national language status for Bengali along with Urdu. Many workers, leaders and supporters were arrested. But the wave of protests and strikes spread all over the province like a wildfire. The Muslim League Government tried to control the situation by banning all meetings and processions and firing upon student gatherings and rallys. But these actions backfired with greater intensity. Especially the student killings of Feb 21 and 22, 1952 stunned the people of East Pakistan, and ultimately severed the last bond with West Pakistan marking the end of Muslim League in East Pakistan (Islam 1978:38). The foundation stone of Bangladesh was laid down. Although Bengali was recognized later as a state language along with Urdu in the 1956 constitution, it was attacked continuously by the West Pakistani administration. For more details on the language movement, see Umar (1970).

Administration and politics

The civil-military bureaucracy was dominated by the West Pakistanis, especially the Punjabis, even before the partition. The reason for this dominance was historical. The British regarded them as the "martial race", and recruited them to the military completely excluding the Bengalis from the army (Jahan 1972:25). By contrast, the Bengalis were regarded as "political" rather than "governmental" (Marshall 1959:253) because of their political history (Jahan 1972:20). It is worthwhile to note that among the 133 Muslim Indian Civil Service/Indian Police Service (ICS/IPS)

officers who opted for Pakistan, only one was found to be a Bengali Muslim (Braibanti 1966:49).

After the partition, the vacuum created by the departure of Hindu administrative officials from East Pakistan was filled by an influx of officials and administrators from West Pakistan. This West Pakistani control limited the participation by the Bengalis in the government sector. The unequal distribution of Bengali-Non-Bengali representation in the civil service of Pakistan (CSP) can be seen in Table 5. The influx of non-Bengali officials at every level to East Pakistan was annoying to the people particularly the students of the University of Dhaka, who were aspring to get to these positions. The Bengalis were also being denied jobs in the Army, Navy and Air Force of Pakistan because of their lack of proficiency in Urdu (Maniruzzaman 1982:5).

The real power was placed in the hands of the central power elites, a very small group of administrators at the higher echelon abstracted from the civil servants (see Papanek 1967:76-79). The bulk of the CSPs was kept outside the elite groups. Table 6 shows the distribution of the power elites, where the representation of Bengalis was conspicuous by its low presence. Even in the late '60s, when the Bengali nationalist movement was at its peak, East Pakistanis did not constitute more than 20 per cent of the power elites. In the mid-50s, the proportion was around 7 per cent. The situation in the military was worse (Table 7). Although the civil service of Pakistan adopted a policy of quota system for each unit to counteract the imbalance, the promotion to the central elite groups was limited to West Pakistanis. The military did not even adopt such a policy even in paper (Jahan 1972:26).

The centralization and monopolization of administrative and political power by the West Pakistani civil-military elites caused great discontent among the Bengalis. As a result, the Bengali leaders demanded provincial autonomy for East Pakistan. The issue of autonomy gained public support and swept the United Front to power in the 1954 election defeating the Muslim League in East Pakistan. The Central Government did not care about this democratic verdict. The United Front ministry was dismissed by the centre within six weeks of its assumption of power. There was no election by adult franchise in the country until 1970. Again the Muslim League was defeated and the Awami League Party gained an absolute majority nationally. Instead of transfering power to the

TABLE 5

CSP Representation in East and West Pakistan

Year	Total No. of Officers	East Pakistan		West Pakistan	
		No.	% of Total	No.	% of Total
1948	18	2	11.1	16	88.9
1949	20	9	45.0	11	55.0
1950	20	6	30.0	14	70.0
1951	11	4	36.4	7	63.6
1952	17	5	29.4	12	70.6
1953	13	3	23.1	10	77.9
1954	25	7	28.0	18	72.0
1955	17	5	29.4	12	70.6
1956	21	11	52.4	10	47.6
1957	20	7	35.0	13	65.0
1958	24	10	41.7	14	58.3
1959	24	12	50.0	12	50.0
1960	31	10	32.3	19	67.7
1961	27	10	37.0	17	63.0
1962	27	12	44.5	15	55.5
1963	31	13	41.9	18	58.1
1964	33	14	42.2	19	57.8
1965	30	15	50.0	15	50.0
1966	30	14	46.6	16	53.4
1967	30	13	43.3	17	56.7

Source: Hussain, A. 1979. Elite Politics in an Ideological State. London: Dawson and Dawson. P. 65.

TABLE 6

Representation in the higher ranks of the central secretariat in East and West Pakistan, 1955 and 1968-69 (in percentage)

	1955		1968-69	
Rank	East	West	East	West
Secretary	0.0	100.0	14.0	86.0
Joint secretary	7.3	92.7	20.0	80.0
Deputy secretary	7.5	92.5	6.0	94.0
Under secretary	7.0	93.0	---	---
Other officers	---	----	18.0	82.0

Sources: Pakistan 1956. Constituent Assembly Debates. Vol. I. January 17. P. 1844; and San Gupta, J. 1974. History of Freedom Movement in Bangladesh 1943-1973: Some Involvement. Calcutta: Naya Prakash. P. 182.

TABLE 7

Representation of military elite in East Pakistan and West Pakistan, 1955

	No. of Officers		Percentage		Per million	
Service	East	West	East	West	East	West
Army	14	894	1.5	98.5	0.3	23.3
Navy	7	593	1.2	98.8	0.1	15.4
Air force	60	640	8.6	91.4	1.2	16.7

Source: Dawn (Karachi), January 8, 1955.

elected representatives, Pakistani army attacked East Pakistan that forced the Bengalis to plunge into the liberation war.

Economic and social development

We know that West Pakistan had advantages over East Pakistan even before partition. After the partition, the influx of the industrial entrepreneurs and financial resources played a significant role in the industrial development of West Pakistan. The investment in industry and infrastructure was concentrated in Karachi (Papanek 1967:23), when East Pakistan had lost most of its administrators, merchants, and professionals during partition. Although 60 per cent of all exports were produced in East Pakistan, the resulting profits accrued to West Pakistan, because the majority of the manufacturers and exporters were in West Pakistan (Papanek 1967:19-23). It appeared as if Karachi replaced Calcutta and East Pakistan remained a hinterland (Arther and McNicoll 1978:25). Under such a condition, a decent government would have taken sustained efforts to improve the economic situation in East Pakistan. But Pakistani economic planning, dominated by the bureaucrats, ignored this and continued to formulate policies based on "one-economy" arguing that there were greater economic demands in the western wing (Haq 1963:113).

The lion's share of the national resources was being allocated to West Pakistan. The development expenditure (public and private sector) in East and West Pakistan is shown in Table 8. The allocations to East Pakistan was 35.9 per cent in the First (1955-60), 38.3 per cent in the Second (1960-65), and 45.2 per cent in the Third Five Year Plans (1965-70). Although the proportion for East Pakistan had increased from the first to the third plan, the share for West was always higher. The picture in the private sector investment was even worse. Only 21.9 per cent and 25.6 per cent of the total private investment was allocated to East Pakistan in the Second and Third Five Year Plan respectively. Since the economy was heavily dependent on agriculture, both the regions needed modernization of agriculture. East Pakistan needed more than the West, because agriculture was more important over there. But the distribution of fertilizers and improved seeds for major crops was much higher in West Pakistan (shown in Table 9 and 10) in addition to irrigation programmes. East

TABLE 8

Development expenditures (public and private sectors) in East and West Pakistan during three Five Year Plans 1955-1970 (in percentage)

	First Plan (55-60)		Second Plan (60-65)		Third Plan (65-70)	
Sector	East	West	East	West	East	West
Public sector	35.9	64.1	38.3	61.7	45.2	54.8
Private sector	----	----	21.9	78.1	25.6	74.4
Percentage of total	----	----	31.0	69.0	36.0	64.0

Sources: Rahman, M.A. 1968. East and West Pakistan: A Problem in the Political Economy of Regional Planning. Cambridge: Center for International Affairs, Harvard University. P. 20; and Planning Commission 1970. An Outline of the Fourth Five Year Plan (1970-75). Karachi: Government of Pakistan Press. P. 26.

TABLE 9

Distribution of fertilizer in East and West Pakistan during 1960/1 - 1967/8 (in thousand nutrient tons)

Year	East Pakistan	West Pakistan
1960/1	24	31
1964/5	45	87
1965/6	54	71
1966/7	77	116
1967/8	115	193

Source: Bose, S.R. 1972. East-West contrast in Pakistan's Agricultural Development. lIn Griffin, K., and Khan, A.R. (eds.) 1972. Growth and Inequality in Pakistan. London: The Macmillan Press Ltd. P. 81.

TABLE 10

Distribution of improved seed of major crops in East and West Pakistan during 1961/2 - 1967/8 (in thousand tons)

Year	East Pakistan	West Pakistan
1961/2	3	--
1964/5	9	31
1965/6	8	56
1966/7	6	38
1967/8	12	128

Source: Bose 1972: 84.

Pakistan was neglected in irrigation and flood control.

As priority was given to West Pakistan in all spheres of economic development, the economy in East Pakistan stagnated. The gross domestic product (GDP) and the annual rates of growth for the two regions are presented in Table 11. It shows that the per capita GDP income fell from Rs.305 in 1949-50 to Rs.288 in 1959-60, with a slight increase in 1964-65. In West Pakistan, the per capita income increased steadily and substantially. The per capita economic growth rate increased from -0.5 to 2.6 per cent during 1949-50 to 1964-65 in East Pakistan, but this increase was much less compared to West Pakistan, from 1.5 to 4.4 per cent.

The imbalance and disparity in the regional infrastructural and social development was also high. From Table 12, it can be seen that the infrastructural development took place more rapidly in West Pakistan. The growth of educational institutions and enrollment of students were much slower in East Pakistan. At the time of partition, primary, secondary and university education was better in East Pakistan. The same type of development took place in health facilities, and transport and communications. It should be pointed out that the disparity was more evident during the first decade of the partition.

It is interesting to note that East Pakistan's contribution to the national export earnings was all along higher than that of West Pakistan (Table 13). Table 14 shows that the balance was surplus in international trade and deficit in interwing trade for East Pakistan, while it was the opposite for the West. This meant that (i)the West was being developed by the transfer of resources from the East, and (ii) the major share of the foreign aid and loans was being spent in the development of West Pakistan. This neglect of East Pakistan and the transfer of resources to West Pakistan created a sense of distrust among the Bengalis toward the Central Government (Maniruzzaman 1982:12), and led to the demand for a "two-economy" policy (for the discussion of "two-economy" thesis, see Sadeque 1954, 1956; and Rahman 1968). Since the provinces were separated physically, different in initial development, economic structure, and international and interwing trade, there was an absolute need to devise a policy of two separate economies for the two units of the country.

TABLE 11

Gross domestic product, population and annual rates of growth in East and West Pakistan (crores of rupees: 1959-60 prices)

	1949-50		1954-55		1959-60		1964-65	
Sector	East	West	East	West	East	West	East	West
Agriculture	850	589	887	649	938	701	1151	849
Manufacturing	12	18	31	79	50	142	80	302
Other	451	576	514	703	567	836	768	1228
Total	1313	1183	1432	1431	1555	1679	1999	2379
Population (millions)	43.1	35.8	48.1	40.2	53.9	45.0	61.2	51.3
Per Capita (rupees)	305	330	298	356	288	373	327	464

Annual rates of growth (percent)

	1949-50 to 1954/55		1954-55 to 1959-60		1959-60 to 1964-65	
	East	West	East	West	East	West
Agriculture	0.9	1.9	1.1	1.6	4.2	3.9
Manufacturing	21.0	34.0	10.0	12.4	9.9	16.3
Other	2.6	4.1	2.0	3.5	6.3	8.0
Total	1.7	3.9	1.7	3.2	5.2	7.2
Population	2.2	2.3	2.3	2.3	2.6	2.7
Per Capita	-0.5	1.5	-0.6	0.9	2.6	4.4

Source: Papanek, G.F. 1967. Pakistan's Development: Social Goals and Private Incentives. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. P. 20.

TABLE 12

Selected indices of social develpment in East and West Pakistan
(per million)

Indices	1947-48		1957-58		1965-66	
	East	West	East	West	East	West
No. of primary schools	706.6	249.3	522.7	394.8	458.5	611.1
No. of teachers in primary schools	1803.4	528.1	1469.8	984.8	1564.6	1390.3
Primary school enrollment	48213.8	16133.9	54974.7	33393.6	69261.5	51287.3
No. of secondary schools	83.0	77.0	59.5	65.6	67.1	82.4
No. of teachers in secondary schools	580.9	558.6	450.6	715.6	586.4	984.0
Secondary school enrollment	12544.5	15057.5	9658.6	19531.2	15524.6	27485.6
No. of colleges	-----	-----	1.7	3.2	2.9	4.8
College enrollment	-----	-----	792.1	1499.1	2178.3	2892.1
University enrollment	38.6	19.3	56.4	58.1	144.3	347.1
No. of hospital beds	67.3	418.4	83.3	490.2	114.1	486.2
Route mileage of railways	38.5	157.5	33.6	124.4	28.0	99.0
Road mileage	5.7	409.6	13.7	452.9	36.9	408.9

Sources: Central Statistical Office. Twenty Years of Pakistan in Statistics 1947-67. Karachi: Ministry of Economic Affairs. Pp. 149-54, 162-63, and 170-86; and Central Statistical Office. Pakistan Statistical Yearbook 1968. Karachi: Ministry of Economic Affairs. P. 477 and 496.

TABLE 13

Exports earnings of East and West Pakistan (million rupees)

Year	East Pakistan	West Pakistan	East Pakistan's share in total Earnings (Percent)
1960-61	1259	540	70
1961-62	1301	543	70
1962-63	1249	998	55
1963-64	1224	1070	54
1964-65	1268	1140	53
1965-66	1514	1204	55
1966-67	1660	1325	56
Annual rate of growth (compounded)	4.6	16.1	

Source: Planning Commission 1968. The Mid-Plan Review of the Third Five Year Plan 1965-70. Karachi: Government of Pakistan Press. P. 38.

TABLE 14

Trade balances for East and West Pakistan 1948-67 (rupees in crores)

	Foreign balance		Inter-wing balance		Overall balance	
Year	East Pakistan	West Pakistan	East Pakistan	West Pakistan	East Pakistan	West Pakistan
1948-49	14.68	-64.83	12.05		2.63	-52.78
1949-50	24.41	-34.70	18.51		5.90	-16.19
1950-51	75.82	+17.54	20.85		74.97	+38.39
1951-52	32.31	-55.20	18.77		13.54	-36.43
1952-53	27.61	-14.99	6.92		20.69	-8.07
1953-54	35.19	-18.33	23.50		11.69	+5.17
1954-55	41.14	-29.16	10.68		30.46	-18.48
1955-56	68.06	-22.21	9.55		58.51	-12.66
1956-57	9.09	-81.78	19.77		-10.68	-52.01
1957-58	25.25	-88.07	43.29		-18.04	-44.78
1958-59	32.72	-58.02	39.71		-6.99	-18.31
1959-60	42.43	-104.26	20.10		22.33	-84.16
1960-61	24.48	-163.30	45.54		-21.06	-117.76
1961-62	42.78	-169.30	45.09		-2.31	-124.25
1962-63	23.06	-180.20	48.44		-25.38	-131.76
1963-64	-22.44	-190.66	38.40		-60.84	-152.26
1964-65	-43.37	-252.63	33.74		-77.11	-218.87
1965-66	18.61	-167.67	-----		-----	-----
1966-67	10.04	-126.76	-----		-----	-----
Total	+487.87	-1804.57				

Source: Rahman, M.A. 1968. East and West Pakistan: A Problem in the Political Economy of Regional Planning. Cambridge: Center for International Affairs, Harvard University. P. 8 and 12.

The "two-economy" thesis was embraced by the politicians and the upholders of East Pakistan autonomy. This economic analysis of the disprity provided a "material foundation to their otherwise vague ideological and political demands and helped mobilize the support of the various strata of Bengali society" (Jahan 1972:87). The industrialists and the businessmen, the urban professionals and the labourers, the bureaucrats, the intelligentia, the students and the rural poor found this "two-economy" thesis appealing. They considered this as the key to the freedom from West Pakistan's neo-colonial exploitation. Although cultural, administrative and political issues paved the way to the Bangladeshi nationalist movement, the interwing economic disparity blew the final whistle for the go.

4. Discussion

The political marriage between East Pakistan and West Pakistan was destined to fail, because the two regions had nothing in common other than religion. Even the cultural expression of Islam, was different among the people of these two areas. With the differences in structural, normative, philosophical, psychological and geographical components in national integration, Pakistani rulers had no choice but use Islam as a basis. However, the policies formulated were not Islamic as they were not aimed at equal distribution of resources to each region going against the equality and fraternity tenets of Islamic teaching. Instead, the central government, dominated by the West Pakistanis, ignored the majority population, the Bengalis, and their needs. They concentrated power centrally, tried to impose a foreign language upon the people of East Pakistan, and exploited economic resources in a colonial fashion from the eastern region. If that was the character of Islam as practised by the rulers of Pakistan, then the East Pakistani people rejected religion as a basis of nationalism. The Bengali nationalism took over and East Pakistan was freed from the yoke of West Pakistan. In the culmination of the freedom movement by the Bangalees, these socio-economic and politico-cultural exploitations played the determining role with the socio-demographic factors, e.g., the physical separation of the regions, the linguistic and cultural homogeneity of the Bengalis, the population size that constituted the majority, and the middle class leadership and mass participation. Especially, the

population size provided the strong basis on which the movements were sharpened.

Whether the civil war and the eventual independence of Bangladesh could be avoided is a debatable question. But it is evident that the Muslim League Government and leadership failed to take proper initiatives to redress the regional disparities. A question remains why West Pakistani leadership did not treat East Pakistan as an equal partner in nation building? Some explanations can be put forward: First, the deep-seated cultural prejudices about the people of East Pakistan. The West Pakistanis "tended to look down on the Bengali as a 'second class Muslim', descendent of converts and so not in the same direct line of religious purity as those who look back to ancestors who brought Islam to the country ... furthermore the West Pakistanis, more especifically the Punjabi Muslims, could see themselves as direct heirs to the ruling tradition of the Mughal Empire in which Bengal had been a subjugated territory" (Johnson 1975:5). Secondly, there was a fear of the disintegration of Pakistan. The central government feared that the recognition of Bengali as one of the state languages might lead the people of East Pakistan to develop greater cultural links with West Bengal of India than with West Pakistan leading to the separation of the east wing from Pakistan. Thirdly, the fear of being dominated by the so-called "second class Muslims" and eventually by the Hindus. However, the situation did not really warrant these at all. The West Pakistani leadership created these issues and tried to mask the real problem to retain power. The real problem was its arrogance and ethnocentrism. It felt that Pakistan was its achievement. Therefore, it was its right to rule Pakistan (Maniruzzaman 1982:24-25). It is true that East Pakistani Muslims did not involve themselves in a communal movement. The political history of the Bengalis was to fight against the oppression, whether it be against the British, or a Hindu Zamindar, or a Muslim landlord.

To conclude, it can be said that the independence of Bangladesh from West Pakistan was inevitable as the partition of India. The regional differences in socio-demographic characteristics, the attack on Bengali language and culture, the administrative, the political and the social disparities all played significant role in the movements toward the nationalist revolution. The population size won everything to its side --- the language issue, the politics, the elections, everything.

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